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Abstract There are substantial differences in happiness in nations. Average happiness on
scale 0–10 ranges in 2006 from 3.24 in Togo to 8.00 in Denmark and the inequality of
happiness, as measured by the standard deviation, ranges from 0.85 in Laos to 3.02 in the
Dominican Republic. Much of these differences are due to quality of governance and in
particular to ‘technical’ quality. Once a minimum level is reached, rising technical quality
boosts average happiness proportionally. Good governance does not only produce a higher
level of happiness, but also lowers inequality of happiness among citizens. The relation
between good governance and inequality of happiness is not linear, but follows a bell shaped
pattern, inequality of happiness being highest in nations where the quality of government is at
a medium level. The relation between the size of government and average happiness depends
heavily on the quality of government; good-big government adds to happiness but bad-big
government does not. Possible explanations of these findings are discussed.
Keywords Happiness  Life satisfaction  Inequality  Kuznets curve  Inequality trap 
Good governance  Technical quality  Democratic quality  Size of government
1 Introduction
People tend to believe that the impact of government on their happiness is low. Headey and
Wearing (1992) found that people estimate that governments contribute less to happiness than
any other potential source. Such beliefs are understandable since people are primarily con-
fronted with -and interested in- individual differences in happiness within their own nations.
Such differences are not related to common or collective conditions, but to individual differ-
ences in terms of employment, income, personality, education, gender, social relations and age.
Perhaps views on government would be different if people would be more familiar with
differences across nations in average happiness and inequality in happiness. In 2006
average happiness ranged from 3.24 in Togo to 8.00 in Denmark on a 0–10-scale and the
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inequality, as measured by the standard deviation, ranged from 0.85 in Laos to 3.02 in the
Dominican Republic (see ‘‘Annex’’). Such differences are largely due to institutional
factors, such as economic development and political freedom (Ott 2005). Governments can
play a role at that point.
In earlier research it was found that the quality of government has a substantial impact
on average happiness, the level of happiness being higher in well governed nations
(Helliwell and Huang 2008; Ott 2010). As yet there is hardly any research about the impact
of good government on the inequality of happiness in nations. In this paper I explore the
impact of government on both average happiness and inequality in happiness in nations.
I will consider both quality and the size of governments. Since I am only interested the
broad picture I will pay no attention to specific policies, nor to the impact of government
on specific groups or at an individual level.
I will furthermore pay attention to the problem of an ‘inequality trap’ as described by
Rothstein and Uslaner (2005). They find strong interdependencies between social-economic
equality, good governance and trust. On that basis they argue that nations can get locked up in
a paralyzing inequality trap: a high level of inequality, without any social trust, can make it
impossible for governments to be effective, and to get out of this vicious circle.
This paper builds on an earlier cross-national study in which I found that higher levels
of average happiness go together with more equality in the distribution (Ott 2005). This
research was based on data about happiness in 78 relatively rich nations around 2000. Now
we have data on happiness in 130 rich and poor nations around 2006. These new data allow
a more profound analysis of the impact of government on happiness.
1.1 Research Questions
1. What is the relation between the quality of government and average happiness in
nations?
2. What is the relation between the quality of government and inequality in happiness in
nations?
3. What is the relation between the size of government and average happiness in nations?
4. What is the relation between the size of government and inequality in happiness in
nations?
1.2 Plan of this Paper
I will start with a discussion of concepts and measures. The concept of happiness and its
measurement is discussed in Sect. 2. The quality of government is discussed in Sect. 3, and
the size of governments in Sect. 4. Next the answers to the research questions are discussed
in Sects. 5, 6, and 7 respectively. The findings are discussed in Sect. 8. The conclusions are
presented in Sect. 9.
2 Happiness in Nations
2.1 Concept
Following Veenhoven (1984) I define happiness as ‘the degree to which an individual
judges the overall quality of his or her life-as-a-whole favorably’; in other words ‘how
much one likes the life one lives’.
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2.2 Measurement
Since happiness is something that an individual has in mind, it can be measured using
questions. Many different questions are used; for an overview see the collection of Hap-
piness Measures that is part of the World Database of Happiness (Veenhoven 2010a). The
present analysis draws on responses to a survey question, developed by Cantril (1965),
which reads as follows:
Suppose we say that the top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you and
the bottom of the ladder represents the worst possible life for you. Where on this ladder do
you feel you personally stand at the present time? Please use this card to help you with
your answer.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Worst possible life Best possible life
The formulation best and worst possible life invites respondents to take into account all
relevant domains of their life, like social relations, work, housing, leisure and so on. This
question invites a comparative appraisal of life and measures the cognitive dimension of
happiness in the first place. As such it is classified as an indicator of ‘contentment’ in the
Item Bank of the World Database of Happiness (Veenhoven 2010a).
2.3 Reliability and Validity of Self-Reported Happiness
The reliability of the individual answers on happiness-questions is limited. There is some
instability in the answers and the answers are vulnerable to contextual bias, like the
sequence of the questions in the survey, characteristics of the interviewer and the weather.
Much of these ‘random-errors’ usually offset each other in the average happiness in
nations. The assessment of average happiness in a nation is therefore less vulnerable to
measurement bias than the assessment of individual happiness. The distribution of hap-
piness appears to be rather stable in most nations in subsequent surveys (Time Trends in
the World Database of Happiness, Veenhoven 2010c). The above mentioned question on
life-satisfaction has evident face validity; the question clearly addresses happiness as
defined. Previous research has also shown high congruent validity as expressed in con-
sistency in responses to this question, when asked in different ways, such as in written
questionnaires, face-to face interviews or interrogation by professional psychologists
(Wessman and Ricks 1966; Oswald and Wu 2010). External validity appears in logical
correlations with various conditions that are likely to be related to average happiness, such
as wealth, economic freedom, gender equality and life-expectancy.
2.4 Data-Source (Data in ‘‘Annex’’)
The question developed by Cantril has figured in many national surveys and has been used
since 2006 in the Gallup World Polls. All findings gathered with this question are brought
together in the collection ‘Happiness in Nations’ which is part of the World Database of
Happiness, and coded as responses to question type 31 (Veenhoven 2010b). This analysis
draws on that source and uses all the findings for the year 2006. I use the mean as an
indicator for the level of happiness and the standard deviation (SD) as an indicator for
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inequality of happiness, following Kalmijn and Veenhoven (2005). A low standard devi-
ation indicates low inequality; a high standard deviation indicates high inequality.
3 Quality of Governments in Nations
3.1 Concept
I follow Helliwell and Huang (2008) and use the terms governance and government as
equivalents. Both terms include administration by governments and their legislation and
jurisdiction.
The World Bank defines governance as follows: ‘‘governance consists of the traditions
and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes the process by
which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government
to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the
state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them’’
(Kaufmann et al. 2008, p. 7). The following aspects of good governance are discerned
(ibid. pp. 7 and 8).
Voice and Accountability The extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate
in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association,
and a free media.
Political Stability and Absence of Violence Perceptions of the likelihood that the gov-
ernment will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including
domestic violence and terrorism.
Government Effectiveness The quality of public services, the quality of the civil service
and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formu-
lation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such
policies.
Regulatory Quality The ability of the government to formulate and implement sound
policies and regulations that permits and promotes private sector development.
Rule of Law The extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of
society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as
well as the likelihood of crime and violence.
Control of Corruption The extent to which public power is exercised for private gain,
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as capture of the state by elites
and private interests.
3.2 Democratic and Technical Quality
The six aspects of governance are all highly correlated, but the correlations between the
first two and the remaining four are somewhat lower (Table 11). There is also a conceptual
difference: the first two have to do with the political situation and the remaining four have
1 I do not report the significance. Significance is the chance that the correlation observed in the sample does
not correspond with the correlation in the population from which the sample was drawn. My set of nations is
not a random sample of all nations; nations were included if the required data was available.
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to do with the institutional quality and effectiveness. I follow Helliwell and Huang (2008)
who discern these types of quality and call them GovDem (average of the first two) and
GovDo (average of the last four). I will call them democratic and technical quality of
government.
3.3 Measurement
To assess the above mentioned aspects of quality of governments the World Bank collects
data from independent sources produced by different organizations. These data sources
consist of surveys among firms and individuals, assessments by commercial risk rating
agencies, non-governmental organizations, and a number of multilateral aid agencies and
other public sector organizations.2 For 2006 data were derived from 33 different sources
from 30 different organizations.3
3.4 Data-Source (Data in ‘‘Annex’’)
All these data, background information included, are available at the website of the World
Bank; Governance Matters VII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators for
1996–2007; as published in World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4654 (Kaufmann
et al. 2008).
To check the validity of these data I compared the World Bank ratings about technical
quality of government with the ‘‘Failed State Index’’ (Foreign Policy 2007). Attributes of
state failure are loss of physical control of territory, loss of monopoly on the legitimate use
of force, erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions, inability to provide
reasonable public services and inability to interact with other states as a full member of the
international community. The concepts of technical quality and state failure are similar and
scores for technical quality and the ‘‘Failed State Index’’, are highly correlated (r = ?0.92
in 2006). To check the validity of the data for democratic quality I compared these ratings
with the Political Rights Index (Freedom House 2007) which measures the degree of
Table 1 Correlations between indicators of government quality in 138 nations around 2005
Voice ? Acc. Political
stability
Gov.
effective
Regulatory
quality
Rule of
law
Voice ? accountability X
Political stability 0.69 X
Government effectiveness 0.81 0.77 X
Regulatory quality 0.85 0.75 0.95 X
Rule of law 0.80 0.78 0.97 0.94 X
Control of corruption 0.79 0.77 0.96 0.91 0.98
Data: World Bank 2006
2 For a discussion see Governance Indicators: Where Are We, Where Should We Be Going?, by Kaufmann
and Kraay (2008).
3 The World Bank transforms this information into scores for each of the six sub-indicators with a mean of 0
and a standard deviation of 1 in the original sample of 212 nations and regions (standardized z-scores,
approximately between -2.5 and ? 2.5; indicating relative positions in a specific year, in my sample in
2006).
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freedom in the electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and functioning of
government. The concepts democratic quality and political rights are also very similar, and
scores for democratic quality and political rights are also highly correlated (r = ?0.71 in
2006).
4 Size of Governments in Nations
4.1 Concept
The size of government is interpreted here as the relative importance of all government
activities in society taken together. In every society we can make a distinction between
horizontal and vertical relations between people or organizations (agents). Horizontal
relations are based on equality and free will, while vertical relations are based on hier-
archy, power and authority. The typical juridical arrangement for horizontal relations is a
contract based on consensus. For vertical relations it is an order, a legal decree, or a
decision; in democratic nations eventually based on legislation. The distinction between
horizontal and vertical relations is important because it runs parallel with the distinction
between individual and collective responsibility. People have a clear and full individual
responsibility in horizontal relations, but in vertical relations their responsibility is rather
limited. The size of governments determines the relative importance of vertical relations in
societies. This, and the additional consequences in terms of regulation and taxation,
explains the importance of the size of governments as a political issue.
4.2 Measurement
There are many ways to measure the size of governments. Here I use two financial
indicators: the relative importance of government consumption and the relative importance
of total government expenditures. Government Consumption is measured as a percentage
of total national consumption, and Government Expenditures as a percentage of GDP.
Government Expenditures is a comprehensive indicator for the financial importance of
governments. Government Consumption is more informative for the importance of actual
activities.
4.3 Data-Source (Data in ‘‘Annex’’)
Data about Government Consumption are obtained from the Fraser Institute (Gwartney and
Lawson 2006) and data about Government Expenditures from the Heritage Foundation
(2010).
5 Good Governance and Level of Happiness in Nations
Research question 1 was about the relation between the quality of government and average
happiness. In Sect. 5.1 i will consider that question for technical quality and in Sect. 5.2 for
democratic quality. The findings are summarized in Sect. 5.3.
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5.1 Average Happiness Higher with Technical Good Governance?
The first question is whether the earlier found positive correlation between technical
quality of government and average happiness in nations is replicated in this larger sample
of nations. This appears to be the case. The relationship is clearly positive. See Fig. 1
which shows a clear pattern with few outliers. The zero-order correlation4 between average
happiness and technical quality is ?0.75. A correlation of ?0.75 is a very strong corre-
lation and particularly meaningful since the variables involved are all very stable over the
years 5. A look at the scatter diagram shows that the relationship is linear; there is no clear
pattern of diminishing or increasing returns of technical good governance. Consequently a
quadratic function does not fit the data substantially better than a linear one.6 The corre-
lation is higher in the right top section; this will be discussed in Sect. 5.3.
5.2 Average Happiness Higher with Democratic Governance?
Average happiness is also connected with the democratic quality of governance, but the
positive correlation is somewhat lower: ?0.60. The technical quality is apparently the
dominant type of government quality and the partial correlations (see footnote 4) support
this finding: the partial correlation between happiness and technical quality remains high, if
controlled for democratic quality (rp = ?0.58), while the partial correlation between
happiness and democratic quality becomes low and negative (rp = -0,17), if controlled for
technical quality. The relation between happiness and democratic quality is presented in
Fig. 2. There is a pattern of increasing returns of democracy and a quadratic function
creates a better fit than a linear one.7 The correlation is again higher in the right top section;
this will be discussed in Sect. 5.3
5.3 Quality and Average Happiness in a Nutshell
The correlations are higher in the right top sections of Figs. 1 and 2 than in the bottom left
sections, i.e. scores are closer to the fit-lines. Government qualities seem to need some
minimal level to develop correlations with happiness. An additional explanation for the
lower correlations at the left sides is natural resources. Some governments can collect a lot
of money without taxation by the exploitation of natural resources. Even if their qualities
are at a low level, they can still contribute to average happiness. The increasing returns of
democracy might be an outcome of interaction effects between technical quality and
democracy. In a metaphor: technical quality is the engine of governments and democracy
is a steering mechanism. The engine has to start first, but together they achieve the best
outcomes for happiness.8 Helliwell and Huang (2008) argue that technical quality precedes
4 A zero-order correlation is the correlation between two variables as such, without taking into account the
effect of any other variable(s). A partial correlation measures the correlation between two variables with the
effects of one (or more) variable(s), interaction effects included, controlled or removed.
5 This stability of happiness, government qualities and size of governments over the years is visible in the
different datasets mentioned in the references.
6 A linear function explains 56% of the variance (R squared) in average happiness, a quadratic function
57%.
7 A linear function explains 36% of the variance (R squared) in average happiness, a quadratic function
43%.
8 The correlations between the technical quality of government and happiness, not just in terms of average
happiness but in terms of inequality as well, are independent of culture, wealth, and the size of governments.
Government and Happiness in 130 Nations 9
123
democracy because democracy is only worthwhile and interesting if governments have
some minimal power.
6 Good Governance and Inequality in Happiness in Nations
Research question 2 is about the relation between the quality of government and inequality
in happiness. In Sect. 6.1 i will consider that question for technical quality and in Sect. 6.2
for democratic quality. The findings are summarized in Sect. 6.3.
6.1 Less Inequality with Technical Good Governance?
In Fig. 3 we see the relationship between technical good governance and inequality in
happiness as expressed in the standard deviation. There is a negative correlation (-0.18)
but this statistic is not very informative because the relation is not linear. Inequality goes
Technical Quality
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Fig. 1 Technical quality of government and average happiness in 2006
Footnote 8 continued
For democratic quality the correlations are more dependent: partial correlations are lower if controlled for
such factors. The technical quality is therefore not only the most dominant in its relation to happiness, but
also the most universal.
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up first with higher technical quality and goes down if a certain level is reached (z-score
close to 0, = average score in 2006). Consequently a quadratic function creates a better fit
than a linear one.9 We see a low but positive correlation with inequality in happiness
(?0.29) for nations with a low level of technical quality (z-score \ 0) and a substantial
negative correlation with inequality in happiness (-0.64) for nations with a high technical
quality (z-score [ 0).
6.2 Less Inequality with Democratic Good Governance?
Inequality in happiness is in a similar way connected with the democratic quality of
governance10 (Fig. 4), but the correlations are lower (-0.06, for all nations; ?0.21 for
nations with a low level of democratic quality; and -0.24 for nations with a high quality of
democratic quality). Such correlations are not impressive but it is still interesting that the
correlation is again positive at low quality-levels and negative at high quality-levels. The
Democratic Quality
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Fig. 2 Democratic quality of government and average happiness in 2006
9 A linear function explains 3% of the variance (R squared) in the inequality of happiness, a quadratic
function 21%.
10 A linear function explains less than 1% of the variance (R squared) in the inequality of happiness, a
quadratic function 7%.
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technical quality is apparently also the dominant type of government quality in relation to
inequality in happiness. This finding is interesting since one might have expected a
stronger relationship between democracy and (in)equality.
6.3 Quality and Inequality in Happiness in a Nutshell
Quality-improvements at low levels seem to go together with more inequality, while
quality-improvements at -already- high levels seem to go together with less inequality.
This relationship will be discussed in Sect. 8.2
If we compare Figs. 3 and 4 with Figs. 1 and 2 we see that the conclusion of Ott (2005),
that there is in general a positive relation between average happiness and equality in
happiness, is not replicated. This is clearly a consequence of a difference in the compo-
sition of the samples of nations which were analyzed. The sample in 2004 consisted of 78
nations with relatively high levels of government qualities. The sample now used consists
of 130 nations, including nations with relatively low levels of government qualities. In
other words: the left sides in Figs. 3 and 4 are ‘quite new’.
7 Size of Governments and Happiness in Nations
Research question 3 and 4 are about the relation between the size of government and
average happiness and between the size of government and inequality in happiness. The
Technical Quality
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Fig. 3 Technical quality of government and inequality in happiness in 2006
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link with average happiness will be considered in Sect. 7.1 and with inequality in hap-
piness in Sect. 7.2. The findings are summarized in Sect. 7.3.
7.1 Size of Government and Average Happiness
There appears to be a positive correlation between the size of governments and average
happiness in nations. In the general sample of 130 nations: the zero-sum correlations are
moderate but positive: ?0.46 and ?0.51 for Government Consumption and Expenditures.
Bigger governments go together with a higher average happiness. The partial correlations
however, if controlled for quality, are still positive but much lower, and in particular if
controlled for technical quality (Table 2).
We may conclude that the correlation between size of governments and average hap-
piness depends heavily on the quality of government, and in particular on technical quality.
7.2 Size of Government and Inequality in Happiness
There appears to be a negative but low correlation between the size of governments and the
standard deviation in happiness. The zero-sum correlations are -0.23 and -0.09 for
government consumption and government expenditures. Such correlations are too low to
be meaningful.
Democratic Quality
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Fig. 4 Democratic quality of government and inequality in happiness in 2006
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7.3 Size and Happiness in a Nutshell
The quality of governance appears to be more important for happiness than the size of a
government. The correlation of quality of government with happiness is independent of
size. Size has only some correlation with average happiness and this correlation depends
heavily on the quality of government, and in particular on technical quality. Big govern-
ment by itself does not go together with greater happiness for a greater number, but
good ? big government does.
8 Discussion
There is a high correlation between the quality of government and average happiness in
nations, with technical quality as the leading aspect. The correlation between the quality of
government and inequality in happiness is lower, in particular for democratic quality. It is
interesting however that inequality is apparently at a maximum at medium quality-levels,
and lower at any other levels.
How can we explain the correlation between the quality of government and happiness?
Is it a matter of causality, or are there alternative explanations? A causal relation can
explain the positive relation with average happiness, but if there is such a causal relation
we still need some additional explanation for the bell shaped relation with inequality in
happiness. A third question is about the possibility of an inequality trap as posited by
Rothstein and Uslaner (2005): how can governments stay out, or get out, of an inequality
trap? The first two questions will be addressed in Sects. 8.1 and 8.2; the third question in
Sect. 8.3.
8.1 Causality: Does Good Governance Make us Happier?
There are three possible explanations for the observed correlation between government
quality and happiness. In the absence of adequate longitudinal data we can only compare
their plausibility at face-value.
8.1.1 Spurious Correlation?
In this explanation, there is no causal relation between good governance and happiness, but
both variables are dependent on a third variable. Wealth could be such a variable since
wealth is likely to affect both happiness and the quality of government. At first sight this
seems to be the case: when income per capita is controlled the correlation between average
Table 2 Correlations between size of government and average happiness, Zero-order and partial correla-
tions, controlled for technical and democratic quality
Government size Correlations between the size of government and average happiness in nations
N Zero-order
correlation
Partial correlation
controlled for technical
quality of government
Partial correlation
controlled for democratic
quality of government
Government consumption 116 ?0.46 ?0.14 ?0.30
Government expenditures 125 ?0.51 ?0.17 ?0.28
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happiness and technical quality of government drops from ?0.75 to ?0.14 and with
democratic quality it drops from ?0.60 to ?0.40. Yet this leaves still some correlation
independent of wealth. Moreover, wealth of the nation depends obviously to a great extent
on quality of government and this is not reflected in the partial correlations. There is a large
literature on the effect of institutional quality on economic growth and the experts of the
World Bank estimate that a nation improving the quality of its governance from ‘low’ to
‘average’ can almost triple income per capita in the long term. In that line Kaufmann
(2005, myth 4, p. 1) makes the following observation about causality:
In fact, the evidence points to the causality being in the direction of better gover-
nance leading to higher economic growth. A number of emerging economies,
including the Baltic States, Botswana, Chile and Slovenia, have shown that it is
possible to reach high standards of governance without yet having joined the ranks of
wealthy nations.
8.1.2 Impact of Happiness on Government?
In this explanation happiness affects quality of government rather than vice versa. Various
effects can be involved: e.g. happy citizens being more apt to vote for investment in public
goods, more willing to participate in government, and less apt to obstructive behavior.
Such explanations fit the literature on benefits of happiness (Lyubomirsky et al. 2005;
Guven 2009). Still, this is unlikely to be the whole story, for instance because good
governance roots in historical developments, which were not always particularly happy.
8.1.3 Causality: Effect of Government Quality?
The last explanation is that better government makes happier citizens and this explanation
appeals most to common sense. There must be some truth in this explanation, since
alternative explanations are insufficient to explain the correlation completely. The fact that
governance is by definition an intentional activity supports this vision. If so, how does
good governance add to average happiness? The data cannot tell us as yet, but we can
discern some possible direct and indirect effects. It is worth noting that these effects are
independent of the opinions people may have about their government, and independent of
their trust in government.
Possible direct effects Good governance can be a source of happiness in itself. It makes a
difference if citizens are treated carefully and respectfully. As pointed out by Frey and
Stutzer participation in elections (voice) contributes to happiness, independent of the
outcomes (Frey and Stutzer 2005). These direct effects are examples of ‘procedural utility’
(Frey and Stutzer 2005).
Possible indirect effects Good governments will be more effective in creating conditions
that contribute to average happiness, such as wealth, economic freedom, gender equality,
healthcare and safety.11 Likewise, good governments can create individual freedom, by
maintaining stable and predictable conditions that enable people to make their own
11 These factors provide for a reasonable explanation of the differences in average happiness in 2006. If
these factors are used as independent factors in a linear regression, with life-expectancy as a proxy for
healthcare and safety, they explain 72% of the variance (adjusted R-square). Apparently there is a strong
relation between subjective happiness and actual conditions.
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decisions in life (Veenhoven 1999). This is what Frey and Stutzer (2005) refer to as ‘output
utility’.
8.2 Why is the Relationship with Inequality of Happiness a Bell Shaped Curve?
An unexpected result of this study is the bell shape relationship between government
quality and inequality in happiness (Figs. 3, 4), suggesting that a gradual improvement of
government qualities, starting at a low level, will lead to more inequality first and less
inequality later. This suggestion is plausible, if we may assume that there is indeed some
causality between the quality of government and happiness. Even if governments are not
corrupt it is inevitable that specific groups will benefit in a disproportional way in the first
stages of such developments. In later stages governments can reduce inequality by paying
more attention to people who stay behind, and by improving collective goods and services
that will reduce the impact of social-economic inequality on the quality of life. This pattern
is comparable to the ‘Kuznets-curve’. Kuznets (1955) discovered that social-economic
inequality increases over time, while a country is developing. Then after a certain wealth is
attained income-inequality begins to decrease. Economic growth is the principal factor
behind this development. The theory behind this curve is however rather complicated and
not very convincing12, and there is some inconsistency with actual empirical facts. Since
the rise of economic neo-liberalism, as defended by M. Thatcher and R. Reagan, social-
economic inequality has increased, at least in the UK and the USA, in combination with
high levels of economic growth. This is inconsistent with the Kuznets-theory. Perhaps the
bell-shaped Kuznets-curve is more adequate as a model for the relation between govern-
ment quality and inequality in happiness. The theory is at least more plausible. Unfortu-
nately we have no empirical data to check this theory, because data about the quality of
governments is only available since 1998.
Even if we accept the theory it is still difficult to predict what will happen in the future,
because the actual developments in the world are on balance not clearly positive or
negative. As Kaufmann et al. (2008, p. 1) put it:
In assessing trends over time, we find that 31 percent of countries experience sig-
nificant changes over the decade 1998–2007 in at least one of the six indicators
(roughly evenly divided between significant improvements and deteriorations). This
highlights the fact that governance can and does change even over relatively short
periods such as a decade. This should both provide encouragement to reformers
seeking to improve governance, as well as warn against complacency in other cases
as sharp deteriorations in governance are possible.
There are no decisive arguments yet for optimism or pessimism. One potential reason
for pessimism is the possibility of an inequality trap by the interdependencies between
social-economic inequality, trust, and good governance.
12 Theory states that in early stages of development, when investment in physical capital like land is the
main mechanism of economic growth, inequality encourages growth by allocating resources towards those
who save and invest the most. In mature economies human capital takes the place of physical capital as a
source of growth and inequality will decline. First, a rise of mass education movement may open oppor-
tunity for all and reduce the gap in income inequality. Second, social policy put forth by the government as a
nation becomes rich may explain a decline in inequality, as the government provides transfers, welfare,
retirement pension, and public health care.
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8.3 Can Happiness Help Governments Out of an ‘Inequality Trap’?
Rothstein and Uslaner (2005) find, with references to the social-economic histories in
Scandinavian countries, that honest and effective governments can create more social-
economic equality. This leads to more social trust, and trust is an important condition for
good governance. These interdependencies between equality, good governance, and trust
imply however that nations can also get locked up in a paralyzing inequality trap. As
Rothstein and Uslaner (ibid, p. 45) put it:
While equality and honest government come first, the reciprocal effects we posit
make it difficult (at best) for countries to escape the inequality trap.
How can governments overcome this social-economic inequality trap? The interde-
pendencies between social-economic inequality, governance and trust are, first of all, not
complete. Every one of these variables can, up to a point, be manipulated independently of
the other two. Social-economic inequality can be reduced by trade-unions, selective for-
eign aid and non-governmental organizations, independently of government and trust.
Governance can be improved by technical advice and support from international organi-
zations like the World Bank, IMF and OECD.13 And last but not least: trust can go up by
cooperation, common interests and solidarity. In that respect there are ample opportunities
to avoid deadlocks, or to get out of them.
A more specific additional option is the promotion of happiness. Happiness is probably
less vulnerable for social-economic inequality than trust. The impact of social-economic
inequality on happiness is relatively low (Veenhoven 2005).14 As discussed in the previous
sections happiness depends heavily on the quality of governments, but there is also a
positive impact of happiness on governance and trust. As Guven puts it (2009, abstract):
Happy people have a higher desire to vote, perform more volunteer work, and more
frequently participate in public activities. They also have a higher respect for law and
order, hold more association memberships, are more attached to their neighborhood,
and extend more help to others.
The promotion of happiness is therefore an interesting additional option to stay away
from the inequality trap as posited by Rothstein and Uslaner. In many nations average
happiness has increased by developments like economic growth, emancipation, individu-
alization and life-style differentiation (Veenhoven 1999). Some minorities have success-
fully pressed for equal opportunities, in particular women, handicapped people,
homosexuals, black people and the elderly. Governments can support and stimulate such
13 Three interesting down-to-earth options for poor nations are:
a. the registration of property rights, in particular for real estate, i.e. have a land registry. As has been
demonstrated by De Soto (2000) this is an important condition for economic development.
b. to register people, i.e. set up registrar’s offices, as a necessary condition to organise adequate public
education and health services.
c. to develop and implement general principles of good governance, to achieve decent and respectful
relations between government institutions and citizens. Well-known examples are: carefulness and
accuracy of decisions, respecting all interests, accounting for decisions, fair-play and equality (equal
situations are treated equally), respect for reasonable expectations, no de´tournement de pouvoir (powers
have to be used in accordance with their legal background), proportionality (no disproportional
consequences for citizens, relative to public interests).
14 The correlation between social-economic inequality and happiness is also lower than the correlation
between social-economic and trust: around 2006 -0.25 and -0.36 respectively.
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developments. This is an additional option for governments to stay away or to get out of a
social-economic inequality trap. Obviously this additional option is unfeasible if there is a
visible and appalling economic inequality, beyond any moral standards. Then social trust
will evaporate and the government will be paralyzed indeed by the unwillingness of people
to cooperate.
9 Conclusions
There is a positive relation between the quality of government, the technical quality in
particular, and average happiness in nations. There is a bell shaped relation with inequality
in happiness. The relations are up to a point based on causality. These findings suggest that
improvement of the technical quality will usually lead to a higher average happiness.
Starting at a low level this improvement will also lead to more inequality in happiness
firstly and to less inequality later. The relation between the size of government and average
happiness depends on the quality of governments; big government adds to happiness only
when its quality is good.
It seems plausible therefore that government can promote happiness, and reduce
inequality eventually, by improving their quality and their technical quality in particular.
This conclusion is interesting because the improvement of technical quality is usually not a
controversial issue. Most people will agree that improving the technical quality is perfectly
all right, even if they have different political priorities otherwise.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncom-
mercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
Annex
Average happiness: (0–10-scale, worst/best possible life).
Inequality in happiness: standard deviation happiness in nations (low/high inequality).
Data-source happiness: Veenhoven (2010b).
Technical quality of governments: average standardized scores (low–high) for: gov-
ernment effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption.
Democratic quality of governments: average standardized scores (low–high) for: voice
and accountability and political stability.
Data-source quality of governments: World Bank Kaufmann et al. (2008).
Government consumption: percentage of government consumption in total national
consumption (reversed to 0–10-scale, high-low level of government consumption).
Data-source: Fraser Institute, Gwartney and Lawson (2006).
Government expenditures: percentage of government expenditures in GDP (reversed to
0–100-scale, high-low levels of government expenditures).
Data-source: Heritage Foundation & Wall Street Journal (2010).
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Data 2006
Average
happiness
Inequality
happiness
Technical
quality
Democratic
quality
Government
consumption
Government
expenditures
Albania 4.74 1.81 -0.49 -0.19 9.11 75.6
Algeria 5.91 1.97 -0.55 -0.97 4.02 74.4
Angola 4.46 1.78 -1.21 -0.82 1.69 40.1
Argentina 6.27 2.01 -0.44 0.19 6.66 81.5
Armenia 4.21 1.99 -0.28 -0.47 7.76 90.7
Australia 7.42 1.46 1.84 1.12 4.64 62.2
Austria 7.12 1.80 1.78 1.22 4.57 23.2
Azerbaijan 4.80 1.59 -0.77 -1.09 5.91 77.8
Bangladesh 4.31 1.76 -0.93 -0.98 9.72 94.4
Belarus 5.66 1.77 -1.22 -0.84 33.2
Belgium 7.39 1.43 1.50 1.09 2.96 26.8
Benin 3.52 1.63 -0.52 0.33 7.75 86.6
Bolivia 5.36 1.81 -0.78 -0.43 6.21 68.1
Bosnia & H. 5.06 2.36 -0.46 -0.16 5.59 47.8
Botswana 4.63 2.07 0.67 0.90 0.00 50.5
Brazil 6.51 2.62 -0.20 0.15 4.46 71.7
Bulgaria 3.77 1.91 0.10 0.51 5.86 49.8
Burkina F. 3.80 1.56 -0.54 -0.18 5.55 87.3
Burma/My. 5.32 1.46 -1.73 -1.51 97.3
Burundi 4.38 1.40 -1.15 -1.22 4.61 62.6
Cambodia 3.63 1.68 -0.97 -0.64 90.9
Cameroon 3.92 1.86 -0.90 -0.64 8.02 93.0
Canada 7.40 1.56 1.86 1.21 4.24 53.4
Chad 3.44 1.76 -1.25 -1.64 8.90 85.2
Chile 6.24 2.19 1.27 0.84 7.21 87.5
China 4.77 1.95 -0.34 -1.02 3.72 86.0
Colombia 5.95 2.44 -0.17 -0.95 5.16 68.3
Costa Rica 7.04 2.11 0.39 0.90 6.68 85.2
Croatia 5.77 2.15 0.23 0.49 23.2
Cuba 5.45 2.11 -0.82 -0.90 3.99 0.0
Cyprus 6.19 2.10 1.06 0.80 5.17 48.3
Czech R. 6.42 2.03 0.79 0.92 2.73 36.8
Denmark 8.00 1.35 2.13 1.23 1.63 9.3
Dom. R. 5.13 3.02 -0.43 0.14 9.45 90.1
Ecuador 5.10 2.31 -0.99 -0.62 7.52 84.5
Egypt 5.23 2.63 -0.40 -1.10 7.41 72.1
El Salvador 5.60 2.23 -0.22 -0.04 9.05 92.2
Estonia 5.36 1.69 1.12 0.92 4.64 57.4
Ethiopia 3.83 1.75 -0.68 -1.45 7.93 61.3
Finland 7.61 1.44 2.10 1.51 3.04 24.4
France 7.01 1.66 1.31 0.91 3.11 11.2
Georgia 3.62 1.95 -0.33 -0.53 6.97 90.8
Germany 6.58 1.80 1.69 1.16 4.72 31.7
Ghana 4.86 1.87 -0.06 0.36 7.55 74.8
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continued
Average
happiness
Inequality
happiness
Technical
quality
Democratic
quality
Government
consumption
Government
expenditures
Greece 6.35 2.27 0.61 0.75 6.69 53.9
Guatemala 6.01 2.08 -0.66 -0.5 9.82 94.6
Haiti 3.76 1.84 -1.30 -1.16 9.13 93.2
Honduras 5.34 2.71 -0.67 -0.37 7.34 78.5
Hong Kong 5.67 1.82 1.73 0.89 8.10 87.9
Hungary 5.23 2.04 0.82 0.96 7.83 27.1
India 5.97 2.05 -0.09 -0.27 6.84 74.6
Indonesia 4.98 1.70 -0.58 -0.73 8.21 86.0
Iran 5.29 1.98 -0.90 -1.43 5.51 85.1
Ireland 7.24 1.83 1.72 1.24 4.00 64.7
Israel 7.16 1.85 0.99 -0.23 2.09 28.3
Italy 6.97 1.73 0.51 0.75 4.26 29.1
Jamaica 6.21 1.91 -0.14 0.18 6.13 54.4
Japan 6.49 1.79 1.36 0.99 4.82 58.3
Jordan 6.30 2.01 0.33 -0.63 5.94 58.3
Kazakhstan 5.49 1.80 -0.70 -0.49 6.38 83.9
Kenya 4.36 1.70 -0.69 -0.57 6.48 82.6
Korea. R. 5.68 2.17 0.71 0.50 77.6
Kosovo 4.97 1.94
Kuwait 6.03 1.63 0.55 -0.02 1.98 57.1
Kyrgyzstan 4.58 1.75 -0.93 -1.00 6.96 81.3
Laos 5.11 0.85 -1.01 -0.82 89.4
Latvia 4.73 1.65 0.67 0.86 5.71 51.0
Lebanon 5.51 2.26 -0.50 -1.18 54.6
Lithuania 5.93 1.83 0.62 0.91 5.40 63.9
Macedonia 4.51 2.17 -0.26 -0.26 6.14 65.1
Madagascar 4.01 1.41 -0.30 0.00 8.77 88.6
Malawi 4.13 2.12 -0.67 -0.15 7.24 60.0
Malaysia 6.08 1.59 0.59 -0.11 5.59 75.1
Mali 4.01 1.61 -0.44 0.14 7.99 84.8
Mauritania 5.20 1.93 -0.56 -0.44 4.56 70.0
Mexico 6.74 2.16 -0.09 -0.22 7.42 82.1
Moldova. R. 4.93 1.89 -0.62 -0.48 6.95 66.1
Montenegro 5.22 2.33 -0.46 -0.13 6.02
Morocco 4.59 1.96 -0.15 -0.47 4.47 72.8
Mozambique 4.61 1.78 -0.49 0.23 8.00 73.4
Nepal 4.55 1.55 -0.68 -1.61 8.52 92.3
The Netherlands 7.56 1.15 1.85 1.17 1.49 29.1
New Zealand 7.44 1.68 1.96 1.40 4.69 54.8
Nicaragua 4.80 2.70 -0.74 -0.28 8.29 78.1
Niger 3.80 1.61 -0.81 -0.33 6.08 90.9
Nigeria 4.73 1.78 -1.05 -1.27 0.91 56.9
Norway 7.46 1.60 1.90 1.36 2.29 34.9
Pakistan 6.12 2.38 -0.66 -1.50 8.07 89.5
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Average
happiness
Inequality
happiness
Technical
quality
Democratic
quality
Government
consumption
Government
expenditures
Palestina 4.78 2.32
Panama 6.20 2.33 -0.01 0.31 7.42 88.0
Paraguay 4.86 1.95 -0.90 -0.50 8.26 90.8
Peru 4.93 2.21 -0.38 -0.46 7.81 75.6
Philippines 4.73 2.26 -0.36 -0.72 8.18 88.9
Poland 5.85 2.08 0.40 0.56 4.89 39.5
Portugal 5.43 2.18 0.98 1.08 4.70 29.7
Puerto Rico 6.62 2.71 0.73 1.01
Romania 5.28 2.29 -0.01 0.33 7.15 68.9
Russian F. 5.00 2.03 -0.70 -0.89 3.98 63.5
Rwanda 4.34 1.55 -0.42 -0.89 7.73 82.6
Saudi Arabia 7.06 1.83 -0.06 -1.16 69.3
Senegal 4.58 1.49 -0.33 -0.10 8.57 84.4
Serbia 4.62 2.03 -0.39 -0.28 5.52
Sierra L. 3.88 1.78 -1.10 -0.45 7.86 68.9
Singapore 6.56 1.27 1.99 0.46 5.29 89.6
Slovak R. 5.16 1.96 0.70 0.89 4.36 52.5
Slovenia 5.93 1.95 0.91 1.08 4.03 44.3
South Africa 5.37 2.10 0.51 0.41 4.79 78.6
Spain 7.13 1.75 1.09 0.59 4.79 50.5
Sri Lanka 4.34 1.77 -0.12 -0.95 8.56 83.1
Sweden 7.38 1.63 1.92 1.30 1.12 2.2
Switzerland 7.45 1.70 1.94 1.50 7.13 61.1
Taiwan 6.30 1.84 0.83 0.64 6.67 84.0
Tajikistan 4.57 1.56 -1.02 -1.34 89.1
Tanzania 4.04 1.66 -0.44 -0.15 6.11 88.1
Thailand 5.96 1.67 0.05 -0.77 6.72 92.1
Togo 3.24 1.73 -1.17 -1.01 9.09 94.4
Trinidad Tob. 5.78 2.41 0.14 0.22 5.75 81.1
Turkey 4.67 2.34 0.08 -0.39 6.91 68.1
Uganda 4.04 1.72 -0.46 -0.88 7.09 83.7
Ukraine 4.88 1.96 -0.60 -0.12 4.70 75.8
United Arab Emirates 6.72 1.87 0.77 -0.10 6.62 76.1
United Kingdom 6.97 1.63 1.85 1.00 4.17 43.5
United States 7.26 1.89 1.53 0.75 6.32 61.1
Uruguay 5.60 2.30 0.49 0.88 7.91 45.8
Uzbekistan 5.22 1.94 -1.29 -1.81 52.2
Venezuela 7.17 2.55 -1.08 -0.83 6.17 76.8
Vietnam 5.33 1.36 -0.56 -0.58 9.25 74.8
Yemen 4.55 1.93 -0.86 -1.19 56.2
Zambia 4.92 1.84 -0.67 -0.01 7.44 71.0
Zimbabwe 3.76 1.97 -1.59 -1.28 2.98 82.7
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